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Administrative Reform: Civic Forum Institutein partnership with the Friedrich Naumann Foundation With Financial Support from The Government of the Republic of Germany Presents Reform: A Palestinian Perspective 2003Administrative ReformA Report on The Needed Administrative Reforms in PalestineByDr. Usama ShahwanGeneral Project IntroductionThe chorus of calls for reform of the Palestinian National Authority continues to be heard from many quarters. It includes the local citizens, civil society NGO’s, regional leaders in the PLC, government ministers, Israeli officials, international actors from the Quartet and other concerned international representatives and interest parties. Starting with the June 24, 2002 speech by the US President George Bush, the chorus of voices calling for reform has gotten louder and wider. The Israeli government joined in calling for reform along with the representatives of the Quartet. While these calls for reforms are certainly welcomed by Palestinians and the efforts of the International community are certainly appreciated, participation in this reform process on the part of concerned Palestinian citizens, community leaders and local activists is strangely absent. Palestinian reform is being led by an international group known as the “Task Force.” According to the European Union press release issued 23 August 2002: “The role of the Task Force is to monitor and support implementation of Palestinian civil reforms, and guide the international donor community in its support for the Palestinians' reform agenda”. Following the London meeting of July 10, the Task Force worked with the Palestinians to develop in greater detail the Reform Action Plan. The Action Plan highlights Palestinian commitments, establishes benchmarks, and identifies areas for donor assistance. The Task Force consults directly and frequently with Palestinian officials leading the reform effort, with Palestinian civil society, with Israeli government, and with the international donor community. Day-to-day activities of the Task Force are delegated to seven working groups (called Reform Support Groups) which are composed of donor representatives working in the West Bank and Gaza. The Reform Support Groups in the areas of Civil Society, Economics, Financial Accountability, Judicial Reform, Local Government, Market Economics, and Ministerial and Civil Service Reform - work to operationalize the reform plans and monitor implementation. To equalize the efforts of these external bodies and to give a good section of the Palestinian population an opportunity to voice their opinions on important issues affecting them, Civic Forum Institute, a Palestinian NGO working in democratic development all over the West Bank, teamed up with the Friedrich Naumann Foundation to conduct a series of 42 workshops in the West Bank and 14 in Gaza to mirror the subjects categorized by the Reform Support Groups. The findings of these workshops will be presented in two conferences to be held in Ramallah and Gaza at the end of the cycle of workshop events. All of the recommendations from the workshops will be summarized in a publication produced by Civic Forum Institute. This publication will be announced through a conference to be held in Ramallah on December 17, 2003 To supplement the grassroots recommendations, the project contracted seven different academics to prepare papers on each of the individual subjects. The publication you are now reading is one of those academic papers. A Research paper on Administrative Reform within the PNA institutionsByDr. Usama ShahwanContents * Introduction
A. Oslo Accords B. Civil Service Law C. Local Government Institutions Law
A. Organization structure B. Job description C. Duplication and Overlapping D. High centralization
A. Employment Inflation B. Employment Criteria C. Payroll and Salaries D. Lack of Training
A. Absence of planning B. Performance evaluation C. Weakness of control D. Weakness of coordination
A. Legal reference for solving disputes between the citizens and the PNA B. Transparency and Accountability
Introduction The Public Administration system is considered the administrative body of the state. Citizens deal with this body and its departments through daily life issues. For the citizen, this system and these departments are considered the practical and tangible part of the state institutions. The competence of this system is the criteria individuals use to judge the system’s ability to respond to their human needs and the needs to accomplish necessary services in our daily lives. The Public Administration systems, especially in developing countries, is the greatest society sector and is the one that has the strongest effect on the economic development compared to the weakness of the private sector in these countries and its inability to conduct major development projects. This weakness mostly is a result of a lack of technology and limited financial resources. The Palestinian Public Administration is the Executive branch for the PNA and is comprised of two systems: civil and military. The Palestinian government and the President head these two systems and they represent the political authority that is supposed to steer the executive system towards attaining the aims of the political leadership as drawn by the PLC according to the concept of the separation of powers. The Palestinian Public Administration system has been reformed following the Oslo Accords and the establishment of the PNA in the West Bank and Gaza Strip in 1994. This system is comprised of a number of ministries and public institutions. According to UN statistics, the number of employees in civil departments in the year 1999 just before the beginning of the Intifada was 104,000, while in the security apparatus the number was between 30-35,000 in the West Bank and Gaza Strip. In addition to the ministries, there are also a number of public bodies that dispense public affairs and business and well as implementing public projects. These bodies include: the Palestinian Monetary Authority; the Palestinian Central Bureau of Statistics; the Palestinian Public Monitoring Department; General Service Commission; the Palestinian Council for Development and Reconstruction (PECDAR); and the Palestinian Public Petroleum Commission. These bodies enjoy a kind of administrative independence and they report directly to President Arafat. On the other level, there is also local government, which includes 120 municipal councils, 251 village councils and 127 project committees. The ministry of Local Government indirectly oversees the performance of these bodies through its thirteen branches in the West Bank and Gaza (which are thirteen in number). The PNA and its administrative systems in particular, civil and security, have been of much interest to foreign, local and Arab parties in the last few years as a result of what has been said about corruption in these systems. This interest has increased during the latest Intifada to the extent that the USA and donor community demanded that the resumption of the peace process and the establishment of a Palestinian state be contingent upon administrative reform in the PNA apparatuses. Due to the importance of this issue at the local and the international level, efforts have intensified during the last few years to embrace change and reform and review the practices of public administration. Some developments have been achieved in this area. Therefore, in this paper we will try to discuss the Palestinian administrative situation in light of what information and data we have. Then we can suggest and recommend some points that can lead to positive change. The Legal framework of the PNA systems
Israel transferred the administrative authority of the Occupied Territories to the PLO following the Oslo Accords signed between Israel and the PLO in 1993. Because of these accords, the PNA apparatus was established first in Gaza and Jericho and then in the rest of the Palestinian territories occupied by Israel in 1967. The introduction of these accords states that the legislative and executive authority would be assumed by a Palestinian council that would function as an interim government that continues to work for five years. This council that comprised the legislative and executive authorities came to be known as the PNA. At the local level, the legal framework is a mix of laws, rules and military orders of Ottoman, British, Jordanian, Egyptian and Israeli origin which are the countries or the governments that ruled Palestine in earlier times. The PLC has succeeded in the last eight years in issuing and passing a number of laws that regulate the relation between the citizen and the state and organize the public Palestinian administration and its numerous branches. Here it is important to mention three important laws. These are the Basic Law (which was finally ratified by the President), the Local Councils Law and the Civil Service Law. Concerning public administration, it is important to point out the details of the last two laws:
This law was published in 1998 and deals with all aspects of organizing work and employment in the government institution such as appointment, probation, performance evaluation, promotion, compensation, incentives, discipline, termination and retirement. The most important achievement of the Civil Service Law was the establishment of the Personal or Civil Service Council, which is supposed to tackle issues related to employees according to the Civil Service Law. The PNA President in coordination with the Ministers Council directly appoints the head of the council. The responsibilities of this department include overseeing the employee’s selection and working to develop or improve the public administration employees’ abilities or skills and preparing and maintaining a central record for all civil service employees. The implementation of this law has faced a number of obstacles especially those concerning its financial part, which was not implemented while the administrative part was implemented. This situation has limited the effectiveness of this law regarding the organization of employees’ affairs and obtaining the benefits as planned. In addition, political appointments and having more than one job has weakened the credibility of this law.
The PLC issued this law in 1997, which came after the Local Councils Election Law in 1996. These two laws came to lay the foundations for establishing local government in Palestine with the aim of achieving decentralization thus enabling local councils to participate in promoting social and economic development. However, a critical study of the above-mentioned laws revealed that most of their paragraphs are copied from the Jordanian municipal law issued in 1955, which came to strengthen centralization of authority and weaken the local government. The afore-mentioned law gave wide authority to the local government minister concerning the election of local councils and overseeing their financial and administrative affairs. The decisions issued by the Ministry of Local Government when the PNA was established in the West Bank and Gaza to set up 120 new municipal councils and 251 new village councils without adequate study or preparation clearly reflects the trend.. Undoubtedly, the aim behind the move was political and was intended to solicit more funds from the donor community without considering the technical and economic ramifications of the decision. Major issues in the Palestinian Public Administration
Most of the PNA official departments and ministries lack organizational structures that define the administrative positions and jurisdictions at both the horizontal and vertical levels within these departments. Structure is very important to draw lines of authority and relations between the different offices that make up one administrative unit. Structure is also the basis on which job description is based and through which the official communication take place between the different departments. One the other hand, even among departments that have organizational charts, the charts do not seem to be have a clear basis on which it was organized, nor it is not known how far it is being applied on the ground. For example, the report from the special committee designated by the PLC on the General Monitoring Commission report in 1996 (pg. 27) has referred to the organizational design adopted in the Ministry of Culture that was in total contradiction to all administrative and organizational basis, where the number of senior officials in top official posts is more than the number of medium and lower level employees. Despite all technical help offered by foreign and international institutions such as the USAID and UNDP in this regard, still and unfortunately, their recommendations were not implemented though these studies took many months to prepare and were financially quite costly. The lack of proper administrative structure usually results in administrative chaos in the distribution of powers and confusion in both horizontal and vertical relations negatively impacting performance.
An administrative unit is comprised of a number of posts with employees where job analysis, which includes job description and job specifications, is the scientific way to match the right applicant for the right position. If this is not done, then a gap will exist between the needed skills and the employees existing skills. This is one of the main reasons for low productivity, poor performance and low morale. Job description is not only important when hiring employees, but also very important in realizing administrative missions and other things such as promotion, training, evaluation, monitoring, payroll and discipline. Different ministries and public commissions have made some attempts, such as that done by the Ministry of Planning, to obtain a job description to be implemented, although numerous ministries are still lacking this important measure. One of the most dangerous consequences was duplication and overlapping as well as a large number of employees attempting to have more powers than was decided. Naturally this will result in disputes and will place obstacles to realizing objectives.
As a result of the poor and distorted organizational design and the unbalanced situation between the different ministries and government departments on the one hand as well as among the different administrative levels on the other, and the absence of job descriptions, the phenomenon of overlapping and job duplication has intensified. For example, it is noted that more than one department in a particular ministry has the same mission or do the same job. In addition, different ministries have identical responsibilities such as the Ministry of Local Government and the Ministry of Interior and also the Ministry of Local Government and the Ministry of Planning. In this regard the special PLC designated committee on the report of the Public Monitoring Commission 1996 ( p . 12 pointed “the Ministry of Civil Affairs is taking up the powers of the Ministry of Finance in the area of tax relief which resulted in a situation where the PNA lost an important source of revenue.” The same report also pointed to power disputes between some municipal councils and the Energy Authority regarding the electricity distribution network. In 1993, considering the possibility of establishing an independent Palestinian state, the PLO drafted the powers and responsibilities of the different ministries, but the later development that came after the establishment of the PNA and the local political effects stopped the implementation of the original organizational plan.
There is a high level of centralization in the higher echelons of the government apparatus. and we find that the most important decision remain in the hands of the PNA President and a number of powerful ministers who not only issue decisions pertaining to the peace process, but also relating to different administrative areas, especially in the area of employment in major government posts. It is also noted that over-concentration of authority features the interrelations between the different ministries and their regional branches. These branches serve as executive offices that implement the orders of the central authority without having any power to participate in making important decisions pertaining to their work though these branches, are in the field, and have a better knowledge of the public needs than that of the central authority. High centralization is more conspicuous in the relation between the central authority and local government. This is a result of the fact that most of the mayors and local council members were appointed by the outgoing Minister of Local Government and so they have become committed to the central authority to maintain their posts. At the other level, over-concentration of authority appears in the way mayors dispense their business as these mayors attempt to oversee and control every issue in their councils. The trend for centralization in the relation between the central authority and local government was legalized by the Local Councils Law in 1997 and the Local Councils Election Law in 1996. According to paragraph two of the Local Councils Law, the Ministry of Local Government plans as a general policy for the performance of the Palestinian Local Councils and oversees the jurisdiction and work of these councils and the affairs of organizing or implementing public projects, budgets and financial, administrative and legal monitoring in addition to special measures for forming these councils. According to paragraph 19, section two of the same law, the Ministry of Local Government is the body which issues rules for the Local Government Councils employees defining their duties, posts and how they are appointed, promoted, fired, disciplined. It also addresses leave issues, health care and insurance as well as salaries and benefits or any other expenditure including capacity building courses or any other affairs related to municipal employees. According to paragraph twenty-one of the same law, the Local Council is not allowed to borrow money from any particular party without obtaining the consent of the Minister of Local Government. Strong centralism affects the efficiency and performance of the ministries and working in public departments or ministries demands daily technical and administrative decisions that low level employees cannot take without referring to higher level decision makers. This matter hinders and limits employees’ ability to dispense their business on time. This situation leads low level employees to depend on their senior level employees at all times and ends initiative and creativity. It also creates a feeling of fear or reluctance by low level employees fearing to commit mistakes. This matter leads to low morale. In addition to that, strong centralism places more work load on Ministers and Direct Generals which limits their abilities to have more time for more important issues, particularly in developing or improving their departments or ministries. 2. Human resources The employment sector is considered the weakest point in the Palestinian government sector. It is noted that all employees’ affairs are not being run according to modern administration principles. Issuing the Civil Service Law in 1998 was the starting point to improve this situation in addition to the establishment of the Civil Service Commission, yet the impression is that no serious change has been achieved in this important sector. The importance of human resources in any administrative organization cannot be overlooked. In fact, the human factor is the most important factor in the success of any institution in attaining its aims. The most important issues in this regard are as follows:
The Security and Civil apparatus have about 138,000 people and according to most experts, exceeds much more than the PNA needs at this stage. This problem resulted for two main reasons. The first is political appointments, especially in higher administrative posts such as general directors and department directors. Second, there are concerns related to those who were allowed to return to the Palestinian territories after the Oslo Accords. Most of them were either security or political employees at the PLO in the different host Arab countries. Most of those who returned were then employed in governmental departments without taking into consideration their qualifications and administrative capabilities. This sector has a contribution of 16.5% of the gross domestic product for the year 2001. The most important negative result of the inflation in the civil service can be summarized as follows:
The Civil Service Law issued in 1998 included a paragraph pertaining to the employment of employees and conditions for taking government posts. According to paragraph nine of the same law, government posts and employees are divided as follows:
Every one of these categories is considered as a distinct unit pertaining to civil service affairs such as employment, promotion, etc. Each category has an independent list detailing the senior posts within the category. Paragraph fifteen of the law states that the director of administrative and financial department is appointed by a decision of the PNA President with the ratification of the PLC. While Paragraph sixteen states that directors of government departments of the first category are appointed by a decision of the chairman of the PNA following a recommendation from the council of Ministers. According to Paragraph seventeen, deputy ministers and general directors of the first category are appointed by a decision by the PNA President following a recommendation of the minister’s council. The rest of the employees within the first category are appointed with a decision from the Council of Ministers following a recommendation by the relevant head of the specific government department. Paragraph eighteen states that employees in the other categories are appointed by a decision of the relevant head of the department. Paragraph twenty states that in the employment to posts, which require selection tests, then written and verbal tests should be conducted. Paragraph twenty-two states that employment for the different posts is done according to a grade of “excellent” in the selection tests. When more than one obtain the same level of excellence, then the more qualified one is appointed or that one with more experience. If that is also equal, then the one with an older age is appointed. Paragraph twenty-three points out that a quota is needed for the employment of released prisoners, wounded and martyrs families. Paragraph twenty-six states that committees for selecting employees should be established within the government departments including the representatives of the concerned departments and the employee’s council. A simple reading of the above mentioned paragraph of the law reveals that the employment of ministers or first category employees is only limited within the power of the PNA President, and in many cases employment for the second, third and even fourth category is not being done according to the law, but rather according to political or other interests and where experience and qualifications are not the priority or consideration in that regard. The PLC committee on the report of the Public Monitoring Commission, (page five) pointed to the phenomenon of the employment of wives, husbands or relatives of high ranking officials whose employment in decision making posts and clear discrimination by the ministers and many officials in PNA institutions in appointing their relatives, clan or town people in the institution that they run, a matter that leads to ignoring the concept of equal opportunities. The absence of job descriptions and the lack of proper organizational structure in most of the government’s institutions have resulted in the phenomenon of random employment. Despite minimizing these employments in the last three years because of the Intifada and the PNA financial situation, nepotism, in general, has not diminished.
The Civil Service Law has several paragraphs regarding salaries, promotions and incentives, yet, whereas the administrative component of this law has been implemented, the financial part of the law has not. This has created an abnormal situation felt by the government employees who did not notice any improvement to their living conditions. There are two notes regarding compensation in the Palestinian public administration system. The first one is the low rate of salaries, which on average do not exceed 1,800 NIS ($400) per month. This amount cannot provide for a dignified life for the employee and his family under the present economic conditions in the Palestinian Occupied territories. Add to this the transportation expenses between the different cities and villages. These expenses have doubled more than once due to Israeli checkpoints that separate the different Palestinian cities. The second note is the large gap between the salaries of the first and second category on the one hand and the rest of the categories on the other. Though many of those appointed for higher posts [director general or higher] do not have high academic qualifications, and were appointed through nepotism and political loyalties. When an employee feels that his salary is not equal to the effort he exerts and that academic qualifications are not honored when appointing individuals to posts, then he will have low morale accompanied by frustration and less commitment to the institution he belongs to. This undoubtedly will have a negative impact on his productivity. It is important also to point out that there are many public institutions, such as local government institutions and municipalities, which do not pay salaries by the end of the month. Many times the employee remains without a salary for two or three months. This situation doubles the bad feelings mentioned above. There has been improvement since the Minister of Finance assumed his post, but still the financial situation of government employees suffers an irregularity of salary payment in addition to the low rate of salaries in general and not taking into consideration the cost of living increases as is done in other countries. Pertaining to performance incentives, paragraph fifty-six of the Civil Service Law states that the Civil service Commission should draw up a system for these incentives for the employees. Part two of the same paragraph states that the concerned department can pay performance incentives to the employee who presents work or research to enhance productivity or help minimize expenditures. In theory, this looks good, but its implementation has been faced with many obstacles. The most important of which is the lack of an objective evaluation system to appraise the performance of employees based on objective criteria. There is also a difficulty in implementing the second part of the paragraph due to the limited budgets of these ministries, a matter that makes paying these incentives a victim of bureaucratic complications.
It is well known that post-service training in the public administration apparatus is very important due to technological developments and modern planning and administration methods. Added to this is the fact that university degrees are not enough to qualify employees taking professional. For these reasons, many countries establish special institutes to train their employees through practical and theoretical courses that take from one week to several months. These training courses cover different employment areas that help participants become more capable of shouldering their responsibilities. Concerning the training within the PNA apparatus, the following notes can be taken:
Many local and foreign parties participated in the training effort for the public administration employees. However, until now, there has been no comprehensive evaluation for these training efforts and no cost-benefit analysis was conducted to determine their feasibility. Since 1994, there were a number of demands to establish public administration central institutes. A study on this issue was commissioned by the government of Japan, which agreed to fund its establishment through the UNDP, but so far little has been done on the ground. On the other hand, it is very important to establish a central training institute administratively linked to the Civil Service Commission. Its mission would be to evaluate and assess the needs of the different PNA departments in the area of training and to draw up training programs with the assistance of specialized technicians in this regard, in addition to evaluating the training program to define their benefits in a scientific way. The need to have such an institute or apparatus which is centralized and not divided between the different public administration bodies comes from the need to avert duplication in training programs and not to relate training to individual interests so that money spent and effort expended will not have been in vain..
Organization and Administration
Good strategic planning has become the most important feature for modern administration. Planning is the first mission for modern managers and effective planning depends on defining aims, goals, and ways and means of achieving them with good evaluation tools that depend on competence criteria and the use of computerized information in all administrative areas. The most important area that must be included in planning is human resources where the department needs for employees are evaluated on the short, medium and long term in relation to the department needs at the time the planning begins. Not only does planning define the future outlook for any administrative or organizational activity, it also helps in realizing objectives with the least expenses as it takes into consideration changes as well as strong and weak points in the department. In addition to that, planning has many administrative benefits. The most important of which is that it encourages coordination between the different offices in the same department in addition to the coordination between the different administrative units that constitute a department. Planning also encourages and activates communication between the different administrative levels where exchanging information between the departments and offices leads to a better knowledge of the other departments’ problems. This can create common ground for interaction that helps in realizing aims and goals. On the other hand, planning has a psychological benefit as the feeling of knowing that there is a plan enhances self-confidence and gives the department and its employees a feeling of security in the face of any uncalculated emergency. Here it is important to point out two issues in this regard. First, most directors in the government offices justify the absence of planning to security and political and economic instability. I believe the opposite is true. Planning becomes more important in unstable environments and in this case, it is crucial important to engage in contingency planning that can be used in case the original plan fails. The second point is that, while the rules and regulations that govern the performance of government department may cripple its ability to plan , creativity can still help in other areas that are not totally tied to these rules. As an example, local government can issue by-laws through which their activities in the financial and administrative areas can be enhanced. In my opinion, the major factor that hinders sector planning in our government departments is the limited knowledge and lack of technical experience added to extreme centralization that limits the ability of directors to implement their ideas for administrative reform and development.
The performance evaluation in the different ministries and PNA apparatuses still depend on outdated methods where the immediate supervisor conducts the evaluation using an old form filled by the supervisor at the end of each six months or one year. In many cases these reports are totally secret and the employee in question is not allowed to know their contents. This secrecy in evaluation is a very outdated method. It also allows for the misuse of power and the settling of disputes without proper monitoring. The evaluation form could even be filled out according to the mood of the evaluator and depends also on the personal relation between the employee and his superior. Sometimes political affiliation affects this situation and this is a matter that could affect the performance of good employees who lack strong political affiliation or good relations with their superiors. On the other hand, employees should have the chance to discuss their evaluation with their superior and have the chance to comment on the evaluation content and the evaluation form in order to correct biased and irresponsible judgment. Many studies conducted in this area in many countries of the world show that the evaluation system directly affects the working environment and the employee’s morale, and consequently the employee’s productivity standards. In addition, a negative evaluation system will result in disputes between employees and their supervisors, a matter that does not help the work environment. There is strong need to reform the evaluation system based upon objective criteria in appraising performance along with considering the quantitative side of the form.
This is one of the major functions for an institution. The supervisor is responsible for this tasks. The function of control aims at making sure that work is being done properly, but the modern concept of control rests on the necessity to relate control to the goals in the sense of whether they are achieved or not, and so goals are the major criteria to evaluate a department or an employees performance. Control includes the accomplishment of goals in a timely way and seeks to reveal the shortcomings that could be averted in order to have a more competent administration. It is a mistake to believe that the control aims are limited to finding out shortcomings so as to punish those responsible for them. But due to a the lack of planning and specific objectives for most of the government departments, control has become an inactive routine action. The importance of control lies in the fact that it is a method to improve performance and improve the employee’s skills. What happens in our situation is that control is being used only to find mistakes in order to implement punishment measures. This negative way of control lacks the real value for monitoring and makes it a tool for punishment, not development. It is important to point out that control is not being regularly or systematically done, but rather depends on the official in question and if he has the time to do it. In addition, there are no standard criteria or even documentation for this process. At the central authority level, there are three kinds of control: the administrative (being done by the General Control Bureau which was established following paragraph fifteen of the Civil Service Law; political control conducted by the PLC and the judicial control that decides on the legality of the measures taken by the public administration. Unfortunately, these three bodies lack the needed executive mechanisms to implement their decisions. An important example of this was the report issued by the General Control Bureau in 1996 which pointed out many corruption cases, yet not much work has been done to implement its recommendations for reasons related to the PNA internal policies and the weakness of the judicial system in Palestine.
One of the major conclusions in the report issued by the Government and Administrative Development Department at the UNDP in 1995 points out that the ministries tend to work in a separate and isolated manner probably due to lack of experience of the newly established PNA in the art of governance. The report also pointed to a lack of a continuous counseling system between ministries in addition to the absence of horizontal interaction mechanisms. This is a matter which magnifies the problem of duplicated work and vague powers within these ministries. The phenomenon of an absence of coordination is not only found in the relations between the different ministries, but it also exists within each individual ministry. This is a matter that results in many difficulties that prevent the implementation of a unified policy, which is an important factor for achieving goals, as considered by public administration. The administrative units that constitute a ministry or a governmental apparatus need to deliberate between each other and continuously coordinate with the aim of minimizing any contradiction between the aims and policies in a particular department and another department so as to avoid wasting efforts. At the horizontal level, we find that there are very few coordination committees that are made up of directors of different departments with the task of coordinating between the policies and aims of these departments in order to come up with a unified public policy practiced by these departments. Practically, the ones who suffered most from the lack of coordination among these institutions are the Palestinian citizens themselves who sometimes have to face contradicting decisions and directives issued by different ministries. The Relations between the citizens and the PNA Public administration systems play a very important and sensitive role in shaping the relations between the citizen and the state since the ordinary citizen generally forms a point of view regarding the government based upon his experience with the governmental systems. The way a government department handles a transaction as well as the quality of services delivered to a citizen have a tremendous impact on shaping his attitude towards the state and its apparatus. The citizen always expects government to work honestly to implement or realize his wishes and aspirations and help him lead a decent life. Based upon this notion a government is the servant of its people in a democratic society. In this regard, one might say that the experience that the Palestinian citizens had regarding the central authority in general has not been a positive one. This negative attitude has been compounded by what the local and international media and political circles disclosed about corruption in many governmental bodies. The negative relation between the Authority and the people can be attributed to the following factors:
Transparency can be strengthened and officials can be held accountable when there is a democratic political system that separates the three branches of government (the Legislative, Judicial and Executive branches), and when there is a balance between these three powers, where none of them controls the other. These simple concepts form the needed base to build a civilized civil society where all people are equal before the law. In the Palestinian political situation, the separation of powers is still not implemented. You find, for example, that the PLC is not capable of fulfilling its role in checking and monitoring the Executive Authority for several reasons. The most important reason for this is the monopoly of power within the PLC itself paralleled by a similar monopoly in the Council of Ministers and the Security Apparatus. We find also that the Judicial Authority does not monitor the Executive Authority, but is subservient to that authority. The absence of transparency and accountability is attributed to the weakness of administrative monitoring mechanisms regarding the performance of the public administration system and the lack of executive mechanisms to hold those violating the law accountable for their transgressions. The system of distributing gifts, which refers to distributing higher administrative posts to those members who are loyal to a particular political faction, makes the process of accountability very complicated and unrealistic. This is because the group that monopolizes the Authority will attempt to protect their members, who took administrative posts within the government departments. This phenomenon is wide- spread in many developing countries and has resulted in much corruption in those places. During the last three years, mainly due to international and local pressure, some serious reform efforts were started, especially in the financial sphere. These efforts have paid off in many ways. The most important of which was the partial financial and administrative reform, overseen by international institutions. This will be discussed below
The Executive Authority and public administration are supposed to implement the laws along with continuous judicial monitoring to avoid any misuse of power or violation of citizens rights. The laws also allow for the citizens, if they feel that their rights have been violated, to approach a court of law against any executive decision such as firing one from his job or reassigning an individual to a job that he feels is an unjust assignment. The same rights are given to the individual citizen to approach a court of law against decisions taken by the Executive Authority. The authorized party that is supposed to decide on disputes between the citizens and the PNA is the Supreme Court, which either ratifies or cancels rulings and decisions being disputed according to the law. Locally there are also municipal courts in many Palestinian districts with the authority of taking decisions concerning complaints filed by the municipalities against citizens who violate the zoning and building laws in their districts. In this regard, it is important to mention two facts. First, the rulings of the Supreme Court are many times not implemented for different reasons. This weakens the judicial system and affects people’s respect for the system. It also stresses the lack of independence for a judicial system, which is under the power of the Executive Authority. On the other hand, though the appointment of judges of different categories is made by the Supreme Judicial Council, these appointments still have to be ratified by the Executive Authority. The other fact is the ignorance of Palestinian citizens about their right to submit complaints against public administrative decisions which they believe are illegal. This, in itself, is a negative phenomenon that requires awareness enhancement, education by civil society institutions, legal organizations and human rights groups working in this area. Financial administration Until recently and before the new Finance Minister came to his position, the financial administration of the PNA suffered much corruption as stated in many foreign and local reports. The most important of these was the General Control Bureau’s report of 1996, which pointed out many examples of wasting public funds. In addition, monitoring the expenditures of the Authority was very weak and disorganized. Also, the revenue sources were not all documented in the proper way and the major portion of these came from the donor community and international bodies for political reasons. The reform plan presented to President Arafat in May 2002 gave many examples of disorganized decisions concerning financial affairs and reported that there were members in the PNA who enjoy the power of spending money without adhering to the required legal procedures in this matter. One of the most important reasons that led to financial deficits in the PNA has been the random employment and political appointments that resulted in overstaffing and bureaucratization of the system. The salaries of civil and security employees gobble up approximately 70% of the annual budget added to this the fact that the PNA has established a number of monopolies and projects that are exempt from taxes, such as the Petroleum Commission, the Cement Company and the Tobacco Commission. These bodies did not follow the rules and regulations of the Ministry of Finance. An example of a specific financial irregularity was payment of revenues from traffic fines to parties other than the Ministry of Finance as stated by the law. The new Minister of Finance took a number of monitoring and organizational measures that generally resulted in improving the financial situation for the PNA. For instance, the salaries for the civil servants are being paid regularly. The financial accounts and revenues of the monopolies have been included in the PNA’s official resources and now there is only one account to which all state revenues are diverted. Yet, the financial problems have not been solved at the local government level. Many municipalities suffer a shortage of resources and poor financial administration. This is a matter that has negatively impacted the quality of services these bodies provide for the citizens. A number of financial problems that affect municipalities are partially attributed to the slow transfer of due amounts that should be paid to these councils such as taxes, petroleum revenues and traffic fines. One must also consider the citizen’s inability to pay taxes and fees due to the deteriorating economic situation. The decision to create 120 new municipal councils in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip after the establishment of the PNA has magnified the poor financial situation on the local level. Most of these councils do not have enough tax or financial resources to cover their expenditures. These councils also do not have the needed technical staff to run their administration, especially in the financial area. I believe that it is very necessary to reconsider this decision, especially as it has not legislated by the PLC , but rather by a decision taken by the PNA Executive Authority. Toward administrative reform It is necessary to review the attempts that were taken in the last eight years to reform the PNA administrative system. The first attempt was done in 1995 under the supervision of the UNDP where a group of specialists were sent to Palestine, stayed twenty days to study the situation, held meetings with local experts, and produced a detailed report, which included their recommendations in this regard. In the years 1996 and 1997, experts in public administration with the support and supervision of USAID conducted studies in the areas of the Civil Service, the Civil Service Commission and Local Government. These experts presented their report and recommendations. Unfortunately, most of these recommendations were not implemented although the research and studies were very costly. In June 2002, because of international pressure on the PNA and the increasing local pressure for reform, the PNA declared what it called “The 100 Days Plan for Reform” in many areas, including administrative, financial and security reforms. That plan had many recommendations some of which are as follows: In the area of public policies:
In the financial area:
In the judicial area:
The 100 Days Plan also included recommendations in other areas such as civil society institutions, education and security apparatuses. In addition, a special ministerial level committee on reform affairs was established. Foreign and local expert teams were invited, under the supervision of international organizations to conduct field studies in different government areas to come up with recommendations to enhance their performance. Obstacles to administrative reform in Palestine Despite the progress achieved in reform in many government areas over the last few months, such as appointing a prime minister and the positive changes in the financial administration area and the reduction in the number of security forces, there is still much to do in this respect and many obstacles are to be faced. The most important of these are:
Suggestions and Recommendations Many experts and those interested in administrative reform agree that any administrative reform plan should be coupled with political reform. No administrative reform plans can be implemented if there is no change or reform at the political level, a change that allows for realizing the objectives for reform. On the other hand, the support at the political level is very important as the public administration system simply implements what it is told to do by those in political power. It is also of utmost importance to focus on the democratization process in Palestine and to respect the concept of the separation of powers, the rule of law and the citizen’s rights. This is the basic concept or rule for any administrative reform. Other issues that can be discussed are:
References Laws 1. The Civil Service Law, Number Four, 1998 2. The Palestinian Local Council Laws, Number One, 1997 3. The Local Council Elections Law, Number Five, 1996 Unpublished Reports 1. The Report by the Special Committee designated by the PLC on the report of the Chairman of the Public Monitoring Commission, the First Annual Report, 1996. 2. The Report of the Palestinian Areas Team (May 14-June 2, 1995) titled: “The Palestinian Authority and the Ruling Mechanisms, Administrative and Government Development Department, UNDP. Published Reports 1. Human Development Report – Palestine, 1998-1999 – Development Studies Program, Bir Zeit University, 1999. Documents 1. Full text of the Reform document presented to President Yasser Arafat – Jerusalem Times Newspaper, May 23, 2002. 2. The Palestinian Central Statistics Bureau for the year 1999, 2000 and 2001.
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